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Abstract
A central concept of economics means that, in the long run, forces acting under market conditions
direct the markets towards balance. Companies producing at average cost and earning normal profit
survive on the market in the long run. Companies, which are unable to operate their resources
reasonably efficiently, stop their activities and leave the market. When they leave the market not only
the owners but all the actors of the market will lose, the suppliers lose market, the users have to look
for new suppliers, the employees who temporarily become unemployed increase social costs, etc. It
is important to clarify the theoretical and practical context of the companies with financial difficulties
whether they survive or leave the market.
In this study I try to clarify the theoretical context of financial difficulties, which may serve as
the starting point of a comprehensive amendment of the bankruptcy act, having been in force for 10
years in Hungary.
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1. Financial Distress and the Institution of Bankruptcy
There are financial difficulties if the company in economic sense is inefficient. This
means it is durably unable to operate its resources according to the requirements of
normal profit, the capital costs of the company exceeds the proceeds coming from
the operation of the assets and the company gets into a status of value destruction:
EP < WACC, but V > D1.
Financial difficulties become clearly visible both for the outside and inside
stakeholders when the company is unable to meet its commitments, becomes insol-
vent.
Insolvency is the cash flow reflection of unsuccessful business decisions [1].
A company’s insolvency may be a temporary liquidity problem, at the same
time may come from economic management, which lastingly does not meet effi-
ciency requirements, when lasting EP < WACC status leads to
V < D .
1EP = economic profit; WACC = weighted average capital cost; V = value of company; D =
market value of company debt
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This means that lack of assets is behind insolvency.
The following Table 1 summarizes the different stages of financial difficulties.
Table 1. Stages of a company’s financial difficulties
Stages of financial difficulties Economic contents of the stages
Stage I
(inefficient allocation)
the company is still solvent
EP < WACC, but V > D
Stage II
(inefficient allocation in the form of
insolvency)
EP < WACC, but V > D
Stage III
(insolvency with inefficient allocation
caused by lack of assets)
EP < WACC, but V < D
Financial difficulties induce changes in the behavior of the affected parties.
The company management maximizing values, the owner and the creditor, all the
affected parties try to take the most efficient decision when financial difficulties are
recognized. The decision promoting efficient capital allocation, the possibilities
to recover from crisis in the case of financial difficulties are summarized in the
following Fig. 1:
In the following we look at the decisions of the outside and inside stakeholders
of the companies with financial difficulties. I will summarize the criteria, which
determine the decisions leading to different alternatives for eliminating financial
difficulties in the case of firms going bankrupt or the ones on the brink of bankruptcy.
First, I deal with bankruptcy (liquidation), then with the bankruptcy-evading
proceedings beginning with the perfect market and approaching practice.
2. Liquidation – Financial Position of Debtors, Creditors
In the 50s and 60s, the theoretical issues of financial decisions in connection with
financial difficulties and bankruptcy emerged in research aimed at the definition of
company value and the role of capital structure in the changes of company value.
These researches concentrated on the analysis of investment and funding decisions
directed to maximize the value of the operating company.
2Bankruptcy-evading proceeding is equal to Hungarian bankruptcy proceedings. The debtor
during the proceedings makes an attempt at the company’s recovery and restoring lasting solvency
in addition to an agreement based on reorganization. In Hungary bankruptcy is synonymous with
liquidation when the creditors will be paid, in accordance with the provisions of the law, from the
liquidation assets available after the company is wound up without legal successor.
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Stage I.
Financial difficulties
Stage II.
Decision in the hands of the
management and owners
Final settlement
Fusion, merger
Restructuring resources within
company
(• taking some activities out of the
market,
• entering the fields of new
activities)
Bankruptcy
(liquidation
procedure)
Bankruptcy-evading
procedure
Stage III.
Agreement on the
reorganization of the company
SURVIVAL YES NO
Agreement
within
liquidation
Liquidation
Selling operating
company as a
whole
Selling by elements of
assets
„liquidation
reorganization”
Fig. 1. Alternatives to eliminate financial difficulties2
The issue of efficient bankruptcy was involved in analyses in connection with
the effect of the costs of financial difficulties on optimal capital structure [2, 3, 4].
HAUGEN and SENBET [5], in their article published in 1978, summarize the
theories published in the previous 20 years about the effects of financial difficulties
on optimal capital structure. The work of HAUGEN–SENBET [5] describing the
36 É. PÁLINKÓ
criterion of bankruptcy on the different levels of market efficiency provides an
adequate starting point to study the financial issues of efficient bankruptcy.
2.1. Efficient Capital Market and Efficient Bankruptcy
Capital market is efficient if the sale and purchase of no stock at market price means
positive net current value transaction, the inside value and the market price of the
company are equal [6].3
Conditions of efficient market are:
• information is available in the widest possible circle, for all actors of the
market,
• access to information is free for everybody,
• consequently all available information interpreted identically and correctly
by all actors will be built in the price of the stock immediately.
Resulting from the competition of investment analysts, the prices, rates always
reflect the real value of the given asset. The real value contains all the available,
widest range of information of the investors interpreted identically at given time.
The real value is the intrinsic value of the given asset, which on an efficient market
is equal to the market price, rate of the given asset (stock).
Under the conditions of perfect market, the company tackling with financial
difficulties will survive, if it creates value. If maintenance leads to loss of value,
destruction of value it will be closed down.
Thus the efficient market provides economically efficient capital allocation,
where the affected parties, the owners (debtors) and creditors of the company with
financial difficulties make identical, economically efficient decision on the liqui-
dation or maintenance of the company on the basis of identical and widespread
information. On a perfect market the stakeholders of the company – group of
debtors and creditors – judge the position of the company identically. Therefore if
the maintenance value (VM ) of the company exceeds its liquidation value (VL) the
company will be maintained, or in the opposite case (VL > VM ) the company will
be liquidated.4
With efficient, developed market institution system, resources could be al-
located efficiently and the institution of bankruptcy would be unnecessary. If ac-
quisition worked perfectly all companies would have buyers, who would pay the
affected parties the real value of the company.
‘There is no doubt that in efficiently operating market economies, where
the capital market is widespread and covers a broad spectrum of the economy,
bankruptcy proceedings have less significance. The more institutional methods for
3Quoted work, pp. 225–253
4VM = market value of the company; VL = liquidation value of the company
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Table 2. Efficient bankruptcy criterion on the efficient market
Position of the company Agreement between the debtor and the creditor
VL < VM VL > VM
I. Solvent No liquidation Liquidation (shareholders)
II. Insolvent No liquidation Liquidation (creditors)
Source: HAUGEN–SENBET, quoted work, p. 390, based on Table 1.
changing the ownership of companies exist the less the system is forced to achieve
what is not feasible in natural way.’ [7]5
Neither do well operating market economies have efficient capital markets,
therefore there are limits to efficient bankruptcy at different levels of market effi-
ciency as a result of information asymmetry and the extent of information asym-
metry. In this way the institution of bankruptcy will have a role in promoting
economically efficient bankruptcy.
Before looking at the role of bankruptcy promoting efficient bankruptcy, let’s
see the limits of efficient bankruptcy at different levels of market efficiency and the
role of affected parties in making decision on efficient bankruptcy.
2.2. Inefficient Capital Market and Efficient Bankruptcy
HAUGEN and SENBET in their article [5] assume a capital market, where
• the actors accept the prices and behave reasonably,
• there are transaction costs,
• the expectations of the actors are not homogeneous.
The two authors look at the financial positions of the affected parties during
liquidation, their decision on the liquidation or maintenance of the company under
these conditions. The results are summarized in Table3.
Liquidation (bankruptcy) means the sale of the assets of the company oper-
ating its assets with yield below normal profit.
According to the table, decision on the maintenance or liquidation of the
company is made according to the following criteria:
1. If the owners and the creditors judge the position of the company identically
• in the case of VL > VM the company will be liquidated,
• in the case of VL < VM the company will be maintained.
5Quoted work, page 1070, paragraph 2.
38 É. PÁLINKÓ
Table 3. Decision on the liquidation or maintenance of the company with financial diffi-
culties on ‘almost’ efficient capital market
Position of the
company Agreement Disagreement
VL < VM VL > VM D
VL > VM 6
SVL < VM
DVL < VM
SVL > VM
I. Solvent No liquidation Liquidation(shareholders)
Liquidation
(creditors)
Liquidation
(shareholders)
II. Insolvent No liquidation Liquidation(creditors)
Liquidation
(creditors)
Liquidation
(shareholders)
Source: HAUGEN–SENBET, quoted work, p. 390.
This decision is independent of solvency. (Insolvency is identified with the
lack of assets, where the value of credits (D) exceeds the value of the company
(V)).
In the case of VL > VM
• if the firm is solvent (V > D), the owner
• if the firm is insolvent (V < D) the creditor who becomes the new owner
will make decision on liquidation (or in the case of solvent company,
using the Hungarian term, decides on final settlement).
In the case of VL < VM
• solvent company continues undisturbed operation,
• in the case of insolvency, the creditor would take the place of the owner
to maximize the value of the credit and decides on the maintenance of
the company, then sells his/her share in the operating firm.
The agreement between the debtor and the creditor on liquidation or mainte-
nance, however, does not mean efficient decision on an inefficient market.
1. If the expectations of the owners and the creditors are not homogeneous, they
judge the position of the company differently and any of the affected parties’
expectations are in accordance with VL > VM position, the company will be
liquidated.
2.a. If the creditor thinks that the liquidation value of the company is higher than
its market value
DVL > VM ,
while the owner has different expectations
SVL < VM
6
DVL = liquidation value set by the creditors; SVL = liquidation value set by the owners
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the creditor will enforce his/her will in accordance with DVL > VM > SVL :
• in the case of insolvency, the creditor, as a quasi new owner liquidates
the company,
• in the case of solvency, the creditor buys the shares at VM−D price,
then (repurchases the liabilities by issuing new shares) liquidates the
firm. In this way, resulting from the different judgement of the position
of the firm, the creditor – he/she hopes – realizes yield of DVL − VM
magnitude.
2.b. If the expectation of the owner is
SVL > VM ,
while according to the creditor
DVL < VM
in accordance with the position, SVL > VM > DVL , the following decision
is made:
• in the case of insolvency, the creditor playing the role of the old owner,
as quasi-new owner is willing to sell the firm to the old owner at VM
price. Consequently the old owner will get proceeds of S VL − VM as a
result of liquidation,
• in the case of insolvency, the owner decides on liquidation in accordance
with S VL > VM.
Summarizing, a company is liquidated if the owner and the creditor together
or separately think that the liquidation value of a company’s assets (VL) exceeds
the value of the expected maintenance, which is the market value of the company
(VM).7
In the HAUGEN–SENBET model the decision on liquidation is independent
of
• solvency or insolvency, and
• the changes in the capital structure.
Leaving the efficient market and approaching the real market – getting out
of the HAUGEN–SENBET’s assumption about the ‘almost’ perfect market – the
following issues emerge:
• Agreement between the debtor and creditor on the market value of the com-
pany (VM ) is not ensured on less developed capital markets. In the case of
companies not listed on the stock exchange, the maintenance value of the
companies (let’s mark it by VC 8) is decisive. Creditors and debtors with
asymmetrical information judge it with different expectations.
7This model does not require the institution of bankruptcy. It assumes unconditional agreements.
8VC = maintenance value of the company
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• Further on, even if the market value is known
– agreement between the debtor and creditor is not ensured
– and economically efficient bankruptcy is not guaranteed even if they
agree.
The reason is there may be significant difference between the market price
and the intrinsic value of the company because of information asymmetry.
The HAUGEN–SENBET model, with the knowledge of the market price (VM ),
assumes that the disagreement between the debtor and the creditor comes from
the different judgements on the liquidation value of the company. Leaving the
assumption of the model, the ‘almost’ perfect market, Etelka KATITS assumes
identity in the debtor’s and creditor’s expectations regarding the liquidation value
and builds her model on the difference of expectations regarding the expectable
maintenance value (VC) of the company [8]9, [9].
In this sense – using the analysis of Etelka KATITS – I have defined the
possibility of bankruptcy or maintenance of the company resulting from the financial
position of the debtor and creditor, in accordance with the information in Tables4.a
and 4.b.
Table 4.a. Decision on the liquidation or maintenance of a company with financial diffi-
culties on inefficient capital market
Position of the
company Agreement Difference
VL < VC VL > VC
VL > DVC
VL < SVC
VL < DVM 10
VL > SVC
I. Solvent No liquidation Liquidation(shareholders) No liquidation No liquidation
II. Insolvent No liquidation Liquidation(creditors) No liquidation No liquidation
1. In the case of solvent or insolvent company, if the shareholder and the creditor
agree
with status VL < VC , the company will be maintained,
with status VL > VC , the company will be liquidated
independent of solvency.
2. If the shareholder and the creditor estimate the maintenance value of the
company (VC ) and in this way judge the relation of VL and VC differently,
the following possibilities are given:
9Quoted work, Chapter 2.
10
DVC = maintenance value set by creditors; SVC = maintenance value set by owners
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2.a. If there is no agreement regarding the relation of VL and VC
VL > DVC
VL < SVC
which means the affected parties expect the following position
SVC > VL > DVC
• in the case of solvency, the shareholders operate the company further
without any difficulties,
• in the case of insolvency, the owners pay the creditors the value of VL
from increase of capital stock (D > VL > DVC) and operate the
company further.
With ownership share of the new owners corresponding to VL
SVC
, the old
owners11 (who following probable liquidation would leave empty-handed)
can keep their ownership share of S
VC − VL
SVC
.
2.b. If there is no agreement regarding the relation of VL and VC ,
VL < DVC
VL > SVC
which means the interested parties’ expectations are in accordance with
DVC > VL > SVC
• in the case of solvency, before the owner would decide on liquidation,
in accordance with the position VL > SVC the creditor (D < VL)
is interested in buying the shares at VL − D value (then following the
repurchase of his/her claims financed by issuing further shares) he/she
will sell them.
• in the case of insolvency the creditor as quasi owner, operating the com-
pany further, following the debt-ownership conversion, can decrease the
credit loss with a sum corresponding to the value ofD VC−VL by selling
the shares.
If the table representing the HAUGEN–SENBET model is compared to the table
compiled on the basis of the analysis of Etelka KATITS, the following conclusions
can be drawn:
1. Decision is made about the liquidation of the company on the basis of the
comparison of the maintenance value of the company (VC , VM ) and the
liquidation value (VL).
11The old owner, in the case of the acquisition (merger) of the company, can guarantee the conditions
of maintenance by sharing the difference SVC − VL with the purchaser.
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2. According to the argument of HAUGEN–SENBET [5], the maintenance value
of the company is the market value (VM ), which is given for both the creditor
and the debtor (since the share is traded on efficient market). The difference
between the debtor and the creditor comes from the judgement of the liq-
uidation value (VL). In this way, if the creditor or the shareholder sets the
liquidation value above the market value, the firm will be liquidated, since it
provides arbitrage profit for the one expecting higher liquidation value
3. Based on the analysis of Etelka KATITS [8] we can conclude that in the case
of companies not listed on the stock exchange, where there is no market
price, or in the case of companies listed on the stock exchange, because of
the difference between the market price and the intrinsic value of the shares,
the debtor and the creditor may differ in the judgement of the maintenance
value (VC). Assuming agreement on the liquidation value, the possibility of
the company’s survival exists, if any party estimates the survival value higher
than the liquidation value.
Beyond the assumptions of the two concepts, on an inefficient capital
market the creditor and the debtor may disagree regarding both the
liquidation value and the maintenance value, because of asymmetrical
information. Consequently, the company’s liquidation or survival de-
pends on the fact who the given shareholder or creditor position will
provide higher arbitrage profit in the case of disagreement.
Table 4.b. Decision on the liquidation or maintenance of a company with financial diffi-
culties on inefficient capital market
Position of the
company Agreement Disagreement
VL < VC VL > VC D
VL > DVC
SVL < SVC
DVL < DVC
SVL > DVC
I. Solvent No liquidation Liquidation Liquidation or
maintenance
Liquidation or
maintenance
II. Insolvent No liquidation Liquidation Liquidation or
maintenance
Liquidation or
maintenance
The extent of arbitrage profit is determined by the difference of the estimates
on the value of the company. The problem of asymmetrical information emerged
in connection with the maintenance value of the company (VC). Consequently
there may be decisive difference between the owner and the creditor regarding the
extent of the maintenance value, which increases the possibility of decision on
maintenance indicated in the KATITS model.
In addition to determine the decision criteria, estimates of the shareholders
and the creditors on
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• the liquidation value of the company and
• the maintenance value of the company
are inevitable to make the decision on the liquidation of the company. This, how-
ever, does not lead – because of asymmetrical information – to the enforcement
of the criterion of efficient bankruptcy. The enforcement of economically ef-
ficient bankruptcy criterion increases with the chance of decreasing information
asymmetry.
The essence of information asymmetry is not simply insufficient information
but a situation where the shareholders of the company (the owners) have access
to information on the prospects of the company and the development possibilities,
which is inaccessible for the management and the outsiders (in this case the cred-
itors). Asymmetrical information does not simply mean differing estimates on the
definition of the company’s value (as I have introduced on the basis of the HAUGEN–
SENBET model) but the advantage of the shareholders for gaining arbitrage profit.
Imperfect capital market, the given development level of the market institution
system, and asymmetrical information necessitate the creation of the institution of
bankruptcy to achieve
• economically efficient bankruptcy,
• and protection of creditors.
No institutionalized creditor protection is needed if the market measures per-
fectly, everybody makes decision on wide-ranging, identical information basis about
the liquidation of the company. In this way all companies are sold at real value,
everybody suffers losses as a function of market prices.
On different levels of market underdevelopment, institution of bankruptcy
law plays different roles.
2.3. ‘Principal – Agent’ Problem and Bankruptcy
Adding the problem of principal – agent to the problem of asymmetrical informa-
tion shows that the introduction and maintenance of bankruptcy law at the given
development level of the capital market is an institution, which helps to meet the
requirements of efficient bankruptcy.
The problem of ‘principal – agent’ is a situation described in the theory of
company management, where the interests of managers and shareholders, who
depend on each other, differ. The manager, who has his/her independent, own
interests as agent, influences the situation of the principal as owner with his/her
decisions.
On a perfect market, in the world of perfect information provision, no inter-
ested parties of a company have information advantage, in this way the relation
between principal and client is free of problems. On an imperfect market, however,
the principal has to ensure that the client acts on behalf of the principal and enforces
his/her interests.
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In the case of information asymmetry, the principal
• obliges
• observes, controls
• urges the client to represent his/her interests.
The cost paid by the principal, the ‘agency-cost’, which is the cost to enforce
the interests of the principal.
In this sense the ‘agency-cost’ means the difference in yields in the case of full
access to information and asymmetrical information. The decrease of information
asymmetry moderates the agency cost consequently provides higher yield both for
the principal and the agent.
JENSEN–MECKLING [10] in their analysis on ‘agency-cost’ started from a
company model, where the company manager is also an owner, who selling his/her
ownership right has conflicting interest with the outside owner. The manager,
who has smaller and smaller ownership, making use of the information advantage,
restructures a part of the company revenue (assets) to his/her own benefit at the cost
of the owner. The resulting loss and the cost of the measures taken to prevent the
former step constitute the agency-cost. The entering new shareholder tries to limit
the increasing, independent interest-enforcement efforts of the management.
JENSEN–MECKLING [10]12 in their work study the problem of ‘principal –
agent’ in order to determine the optimal capital structure. According to JENSEN–
MECKLING, the proportion of own and foreign capital is optimal if the marginal
(agent)-costs of the funding resources are identical, which means all the ‘agency
costs’ take minimum value. In this way the interest conflict of the management and
the owner, as the problem of principal and agent is extended to the relation between
the creditor and the owner. All the stakeholders of the company, taking one of the
roles of principal or agent, are parts of the revenue-redistributing process resulting
from asymmetrical information.
Relating to the issue of efficient bankruptcy, we encounter two sides of the
principal – agent problem, the one resulting from different interests of:
a) the owner and the management
b) the creditor and the owner (management).13
The stakeholders motivated by clashing interests and ready to make use of in-
formation asymmetry, in tense situation (e.g. in the case of the threat of bankruptcy)
make decisions leading to significant revenue redistribution, which deteriorates ef-
ficient capital allocation by decreasing the chance of efficient bankruptcy.
Following the logic of point 2.2. in the following chapter I will concentrate
on the problem of principal – agent between the creditor and owner14, I will involve
the issues of asymmetrical information and risk into the analysis.
12Quoted work, pages 344–346.
13In Hungarian practice the problem of principal – agent exists between the creditors and the
liquidators, too and causes significant conflict of interest.
14The analysis of owner – management as the problem of principal – agent is important in the
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2.4. The Risk of the Owner and the Creditor
MILLER [12] based his calculations on the theories of ‘agency cost’, ‘principal –
agent’ by JENSEN–MECKLING [10], and MECKLING [11] and in this context on
the problem of creditor and debtor. This shows that the risks of debtor and the
creditor are not symmetrical in the decision on the liquidation or maintenance of
the company.
The models described in point 2.2. assumed that the debtor and the creditor
do not weigh the risk. This condition, however, is not possible in his analysis
approaching the real market. Let us see how the decisions of the debtor and the
creditor about liquidation change if risk is involved by using the numerical example
of MILLER [12].
According to WHITE [13], the shareholders and the management15 decide on
the maintenance of operation even if liquidation was economically efficient, this is
proved by the example of MILLER:
The debt of the examined company is 1000 (D). The liquidation value of
the assets in the case of immediate liquidation amounts to 800 (VL) unit. The
opportunity cost of the capital is 10% (r). If the company operates further it has
50% chance to produce 1210 producer’s surplus and there is 50% chance that the
losses of the company will further increase and at the end of the examined period
the value of the assets will be 220 (VL1) unit.
1. The loss of the creditors in the case of immediate liquidation is
1000 − 800 = 200
2. The positions of the creditor and the debtor if positive expectations come true
• Creditor gets his/her claim D1 = 1000(1 + 0.1) = 1100
• The position of the debtor, the owner also improved by
1210 − 1100 = 110 units
3. The positions of the creditor and the debtor in the case of unfavorable situa-
tion.
• The losses of the creditor grow further and he/she gets a fraction of the
value realizable in the case of immediate liquidation.
decision on liquidation. The manager as employee feels the threat of liquidation better than the
shareholder. While the shareholder is able for diversification [8; p. 52. par. 1], he/she is able to
decrease the loss and the related individual risk resulting from the liquidation of the company by
diversifying his/her investments, the management has no such possibility. In the case of financial
difficulties, the management would often avoid investment-policy maximizing the owners’ value to
protect the reputation of the firm and keep jobs, would pursue risk-evading behavior contrary to the
owner.
15In his article written in 1972, STIGLITZ [14] studied what makes the manager to undertake risky
investments if bankruptcy is threatening. His standpoint differs from the concept raised in the previous
footnote.
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The loss of the creditor is 1100 − 220 = +880, which compared to the loss
of 200 units suffered in the case of immediate liquidation increased by
(
880
1+ 0.1 · 200
)
600
units.
Table 5. Changes in the positions of the creditor and the debtor in the case of asymmetrical
risk
Stakeholders In the case of maintenance In the case of liquidation
Position of the creditor
0.5 · 1100+ 0.5 · 220
1+ 0.1 = 600 < VL1 = 800
Position of the debtor
0.5 · 1100+ 0.5 · 0.1
1+ 0.1 = 50 > 0
Value of the company VL2 = 650 < VL1(= VL) = 800
If the company operates further, the owners may improve their financial
positions at the cost of the creditors.
The shareholders feel they are urged to invest or continue the business under
conditions, which would not be an effective decision with own funding.16
This relation leads to drawing two conclusions in connection with the model
summarized in Tables 4.a and 4.b:
1. In the case of non-homogeneous information we concluded that if the main-
tenance value of the company exceeds its liquidation value on the basis of
the expectation either the debtor or the creditor, the company will operate
further, in the opposite case will be liquidated.
The involvement of the risk shows that using the advantage provided for the
owners by asymmetrical information, the owners are interested in giving up
their attempt to maximize the full market value of the company by postponing
bankruptcy and following their direct interests they play at the cost of the
creditors.17
16The creditors can protect themselves against such an agency-cost, in this way against their more
unfavorable situation if they try to charge the shareholders with all forms of the agency-cost. Then
the interest of the shareholders is to decrease the agency-cost by decreasing information asymmetry.
(In the case of bankruptcy, however, this attempt of the creditor has no sense).
17We can look at these games in Chapter 15 in BRADLEY–MYERS’ book [6] (pp. 397–400).
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Therefore, the owner can improve his/her financial position even if the mar-
ket value of the company decreases, he/she is interested in maintaining the
company even in the case of VC < VL .
2. Because of the asymmetrical information and asymmetrical risk resulting
from the problem of principal – agent, the decision on the liquidation of the
company may be far from the criterion of efficient bankruptcy. Therefore,
the bankruptcy law should help efficient capital allocation.
The date of bankruptcy declaration has outstanding role on the decision about
the maintenance of the company.
1. Before declaration of bankruptcy, the owner (management) makes financial
decisions. In the case of financial crisis, the company, even if there is lack
of assets, relying on the resources of the new creditors by priority18 is able
to maintain solvency, to keep liquidity. In this way by preserving ability to
operation, it can improve its own financial position at the risk of the creditors
(by realizing projects carrying great risk). Thus, as we have seen, until the
declaration of bankruptcy, the shareholders prefer continuing the operation
even if more assets are lost and liquidation would be economically more
efficient. The creditors by priority support this effort of the owners.
2. Following the declaration of bankruptcy, however, instead of the owner, the
coalition of the creditors and the owner decide on liquidation and this de-
creases the chance of the owners to make use of their advantage coming from
asymmetrical information, asymmetrical risk without control. The decision
of the coalition often leads to the liquidation of the company even if mainte-
nance would be economically more efficient. Even if with the declaration of
bankruptcy the position is economically efficient, the coalition of creditors
and owners without insurance does not undertake maintenance (VC > VL),
if maintenance compared to immediate liquidation is not beneficial for them.
In order to reduce the losses of certain creditors’ groups, at the end of the
list of satisfying the claims the creditors and the owners do not support the
maintenance of the company if it does not give better position for them.
Fig. 2 summarizes the conclusions on the liquidation or maintenance of the
company. The table reveals that a firm lacking assets is threatened by
• economically inefficient maintenance before declaration of bankruptcy,
• economically inefficient liquidation following declaration of bankruptcy.
18Different creditor groups are threatened by bankruptcy to different extent on the basis of their
position in the rank of satisfying their claims, therefore their standpoints regarding maintenance or
liquidations are also different. New credit, which the creditor is ready to pay by keeping priority
right, is the condition to maintain a company with financial difficulties. The efficiency criterion of
maintenance exists for the new creditor if the maintenance value exceeds the value of the insured
priority credit. This shows that maintenance of the company is possible even if the bankruptcy, from
the point of view of national economy, is inefficient.
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D < V
D > V
VC > VL VC < VL VC > VL VC < VL VC > VL VC < VL
Before declaration
of bankruptcy After declaration of bankruptcy
owner decidesowner decides coalition of creditor and
owner decides
Survival Final settlement Survival (at the risk of creditors) Liquidation
economically
not efficient
economically
efficient
economically
efficient
economically
not efficient
Fig. 2. Decision on the liquidation of the company
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One of the issues of efficient bankruptcy in bankruptcy law is the efficient
economic criterion of declaration of bankruptcy, institution of bankruptcy proceed-
ings.
3. Optimal Criterion of Declaration of Bankruptcy
Based on the described theoretical relations we can conclude that liquidation is
economically efficient if
VL > VC
or maintenance is efficient if
VC > VL .
Disregarding the conditions we used to bring bankruptcy criterion set under the con-
ditions of perfect market nearer to real market, let us return to the starting point, the
assumption of efficient capital market, where expectations are homogeneous, risk
is symmetrical. Then enforcement of economically efficient bankruptcy criterion
is guaranteed, the value, the market price of the company expresses the economi-
cally efficient value maximizing strategy. HAUGEN–SENBET [5]19 in their model
described in point 2 identify insolvency with the situation when the value of the
company (V) is equal to the value of the creditors’ claims (D). Then the value of
the company’s share capital is zero, which in economic sense is the transfer of
ownership right to the creditor.
Thus the condition of undisturbed operation of the company is guaranteed
until V > D. If V ≤ D occurs, the creditors become quasi owners, who with
the knowledge of the relation between VC and VL decide whether as new owners
liquidate or maintain the company. Fig. 3 shows this relation.
A generally accepted criterion of formal or informal institution of bankruptcy
proceedings under the conditions of perfect market – starting ownership transfor-
mation or the decision on subsequent liquidation or maintenance – is V ≤ D. There-
fore, the criterion of bankruptcy gives the criterion of declaration of bankruptcy
and at the same time the optimal date of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings.
• KATITS [8]20, [9]21 revises the relation V < D and refuses the idea of accept-
ing the state of bankruptcy as a criterion of declaration of bankruptcy. As a
first step, by defining Vt < D∗t , it sets the ‘contract-conform’ requirement
of ‘creditors’ claims’. This idea appeared already in the 1881 bankruptcy
law of APÁTHY [15, 16], where the question regarding traders is not whether
they have enough assets to satisfy the claims but whether they are able for
contract-conform satisfaction of given amount at given date.
19Quoted work. p. 384.
20Quoted work, pp. 57–67
21Quoted work, pp. 56–72
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The company will be
liquidated if,
VL > VC
The company is
maintained if
VC > VL
The value of the
company
V = (VC, VL)
State of bankruptcy
V ≤ D
Fig. 3. Definition of bankruptcy
• As the second step it defines the criterion of declaration of bankruptcy in the
form
D jt < D
∗ j
t
assuming differentiated creditors’ positions, insured and not insured credi-
tors.
‘Therefore the criterion of declaration of bankruptcy is defined by
the comparison of the claims of each creditor’s position (Djt ) and the
contract-conform expectations (D∗ jt ) and not the company value and
not the value of all the creditors’ claims.’ [8]
Etelka KATITS, defines in this way, instead of the global extent of the criterion
of bankruptcy declaration its creditor’s individual value (Djt < D∗ jt ) as the criterion
of institution of bankruptcy. In this way putting the date of declaration of bankruptcy
before the state V ≤ D occurs, she defined a criterion, which guarantees greater
protection for the creditor than any creditor’s category.
Leaving the assumption of perfect market, however, I think we encounter
the main obstacle of enforcing efficient bankruptcy criterion because of measura-
bility. This is the situation when the enforcement of global bankruptcy criterion
has fundamental limits, ‘fine tuning’ has little practical benefit besides theoretical
perfectionism.
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4. Efficient Bankruptcy and Declaration of Bankruptcy in Numbers
The theoretical criteria of the efficiency of bankruptcy and declaration of bankruptcy
have special significance in an economy where the following conclusions can be
drawn on the basis of the analysis of 401 liquidation procedures:
• The statements on the assets and liabilities of the companies to be liquidated
are not suitable to follow the assets and the creditors’ claims. In this way the
interested parties are not able to make efficient decision due to the lack of
information and asymmetrical information.
• When liquidation proceedings begin in Hungary, V = D, the efficiency cri-
terion of declaration of bankruptcy is not enforced in the proceedings. The
figures of the representative sample show that the declaration probably occurs
at companies to be liquidated when V = 0 in 85.5 percent of the cases.
• As a result of assets flight and loss occurring before and during liquidation,
the creditors get only 1.58 percent of their announced claims according to the
representative sample. This figure supports the statement that the institution
of bankruptcy is not able to protect the creditors under the current conditions.
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